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Abstract
There is empirical evidence of a cross-country positive association between the number 
of lawyers per capita and the extent of litigation. For instance, Spain has more litigation 
and more lawyers per capita than most OECD countries. How should this association be 
interpreted? In this paper we analyse the variation in both variables across Spanish provinces 
during the period 2001-2010, by means of an instrumental variable approach, to shed some 
light on the sources of the statistical association between them. Finally, implications of the 
results are discussed. 
Keywords: lawyers, litigation, civil courts, instrumental variables.
JEL classifi cation: K41, K42, J44, L84.
Resumen
Existe evidencia empírica de que se da una asociación positiva entre el número de abogados 
por habitante y el número de litigios entre países. Por ejemplo, España cuenta con más litigios 
y más abogados por habitante que la mayoría de los países de la OCDE. ¿Cómo interpretar 
esta asociación? En este trabajo se analiza la variación de ambas variables en las provincias 
españolas durante el período 2001-2010 y, por medio de un enfoque econométrico de 
variables instrumentales, se ilustran algunas de las causas de la asociación estadística entre 
ellas y se comentan ciertas implicaciones de los resultados.
Palabras clave: abogados, litigiosidad, juzgados de lo civil, variables instrumentales.
Códigos JEL: K41, K42, J44, L84.
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1 Introduction
There is some empirical evidence of a cross-country positive association between
the number of lawyers per capita and the extent of litigation.1 There are good
theoretical reasons to support such observation (Garoupa, 2008). With more
lawyers, the market for legal services is presumably more competitive, which
should lead to an expansion of supply, a decrease in prices and consequently
more lawsuits.2 Another possible reason is that legal services are credence
goods (Dulleck and Kerschbamer, 2006) and it is expected that lawyers will
use their information advantage to boost their business; more lawyers in the
market should reduce information asymmetries (since potential clients can more
easily compare performance) and therefore decrease uncertainty which, in turn,
enhances willingness to litigate. A third reason is caused by the regulatory
setup. Certain forms of compensation are usually not allowed (for example,
contingency fees are strictly prohibited in many jurisdictions;3 champerty and
maintenance doctrines in common law limit the possibility of a lawyer buying
a claim from his/her client). In order to comply with such limitations, lawyers
might need to diversify their portfolio of cases or work with more clients to
achieve significant revenues in legal fees [see, among others, Baumann and Friehe
(2012) and references therein]. A market with more lawyers is likely to add to
these distortions. Finally, the likely concentration and nature of the corporate
(fundamentally transactional) market might induce many lawyers to operate in
the personal market which is more prone to litigation (Hadfield, 2000).
Notwithstanding the theory, How should this empirical association be in-
terpreted? Establishing a casual relationship between the number of lawyers
and litigation is problematic. Not surprisingly, empirical studies trying to do so
are scarce and struggle with finding appropiate identifying strategies and pro-
vide not very robust results. We could cite, for example, Posner (1997) on the
U.S. and England, Hansenn (1999) on the U.S., Clemenz and Gugler (2000) on
Austria, Ginsburg and Hoetker (2006) on Japan or Carmignani and Giacomelli
(2010) and Buonanno and Galizzi (2012) on Italy.
In this paper we try to shed some light of the sources of the statistical asso-
ciation between the number of lawyers and litigation in Spain, across all (fifty)
provinces for the period 2001-2010 by making use of instrumental variables.
Spain is an interesting case to consider. To start with, among the countries
for which the OECD Civil Justice project obtained information (Palumbo et
al. 2013), Spain is the country with the third highest per capita litigation rate
(after Russia and the Czech Republic and followed by Greece and Italy).4 The
litigation rate was measured as the ratio of the number of new civil cases filed
in a given year in relation to the population. Furthermore, Spain is the country
1There is a vast literature on possible determinants of litigation, including awards and
procedural rules (the so-called economics of litigation). Our analysis focuses on lawyers.
2This is a standard application of demand theory.
3Following Palumbo et al. (2013), contingency fees are allowed by law in only 37% of the
35 legal systems (in 31 countries) covered by the OECD Civil Justice Project. According to
the report, Spain is one of the countries that do not allow such contingency fees by law.
4These countries (or legal systems) were Australia, Austria, Belgium, the Czech Repub-
lic, Denmark, England and Wales (UK), Estonia, Finland, France, Germany, Greece, Hun-
gary, Iceland, Ireland, Israel, Italy, Japan, Korea, Luxemburg, Mexico, the Netherlands, New
Zealand, Northern Ireland (UK), Norway, Poland, Portugal, Russia, Scotland (UK), the Slovak
Republic, Slovenia, South Africa, Spain, Sweden, Switzerland, and Turkey.
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Furthermore, Spain also suffers from a relatively significant slowness of its
judicial procedures: Spain holds the position 26 (out of a total of 35 legal sys-
tems) in its agility to resolve disputes before the first instance courts according
to the recent OECD results (Palumbo et al. 2013). Even less favorable results
can be found on the Doing Business (DB) Project of the World Bank in its
"enforcing contracts" indicator. Spain ranked 52 among 189 countries covered
in the report of 2014. These latter results show a significant lack of consistency
with the level of development of the Spanish economy.
At the same time, Spain presents one of the highest number of lawyers
measured in per capita terms.5 In fact, we observe a high level of competition
among lawyers in Spain, which at the eyes of some commentators could explain
general low fees (Ciarreta Antuñano et al., 2009).
In our view, Spain is also an interesting case of study in terms of recent
reforms. On the one hand, the Spanish Congress passed the "Law on Access
to the Professions of Barrister and Solicitor of the Courts" in 2006.6 This law,
which came into force five years later (in November 2011), introduced a number
of additional requirements for those aiming to practice lawyering. The new can-
didates must pass a graduate (or master) degree in law, have a mandatory work
experience (a period of two years without a formal salary) and pass a national
bar exam evaluating their qualifications. This reform limited, at least in theory,
the access to the legal profession (before, it was only necessary to hold a univer-
sity degree in law and no bar exam existed). The reform was based, according
to the preamble of the law, on the following goals: to achieve a higher quality
of legal service, to comply with the comparative experience of other countries
which introduced such restrictions and the need to standardize the formal re-
quirements in Spain with those of other European countries. Interestingly there
is no reference whatsoever to the Spanish high litigation rates as a reason for
reform.7
At the same time, the legal market has been affected indirectly by the passing
of the so-called "Omnibus Law” of 2009.8 The law relaxed some restrictions
in the following areas: advertising of professional services and simultaneous
exercise of two or more professions. It also reduced the power of professional
associations to establish indicative fee scales. This last, relatively minor, change
may be complemented by in-depth global reform of all professional services
under a new "Professional Services Act" that could be adopted in 2015 (at least
as a "draft law").
(after Russia, the Czech Republic and Greece and followed by Italy) with the
fourth highest litigation rate when measuring litigation as the number of new
civil cases filed in a given year relative to GDP (measured in current PPP U.S.
dollars). See Figure 1 below.
5With the cautions that are always required when comparing data of different countries,
according to the CEPEJ (see report of the CGAE, 2013), Spain holds the seventh position (out
of 27 countries) in the number of lawyers per capita in the European Union (above France,
which holds position 20 and Germany which holds position 10).
6Law 34/2006 of October 30th.
7The reform seems to be widely supported by the Spanish population, while according to
the CGAE (2012) 85% of Spaniards demand that additional training is required to become
a lawyer. This result contrasts with the apparent satisfaction of Spanish citizens with the
lawyers according to the same source. That level of satisfaction has received a high mark
(6.9).
8Law 25/2009 of December 22nd, on the adaptation of various statutes to the Law on Free
Access to Service Activities.
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Summing-up, international comparisons show that Spain has more litigation
and more lawyers per capita than most OECD countries. Our article studies
the extent to which these observations are related.
In order to do so, we construct a new dataset. Thus, in our study we focus
on a topic and on a period of important reforms for which our empirical results
based on our original dataset may have policy implications (although we are
not testing the consequences of these reforms on the legal profession, but rather
analyzing the period before these reforms took place).
The correlation between the number of lawyers per capita and litigation is
high (0.6806) and has the expected sign in the relevant period, 2001-2010. How-
ever, given the probable endogeneity problems, correlations are interesting but
do not provide for much inference. Consequently, we develop adequate econo-
metric techniques to address this issue and show more accurate relationships
between the number of lawyers per capita and litigation. Essentially, we use
two instrumental variables: the number of law schools founded in Spain by 1968
and the distance between the current provincial capitals to the historical capital
of their university district (where it was possible to study law) in 1845. Esti-
mations using both OLS and instrumenting the relevant independent variable
(lawyers per capita) are provided in this article.
The paper is structured as follows. Section 2 summarizes the institutional
environment and presents the database. Section 3 explains the empirical strat-
egy. Section 4 presents the results. Section 5 concludes with a discussion of the
empirical results.
2 Institutional Environment
2.1 Measuring the number of lawyers and litigation in
Spain
Lawyers should join a bar association in order to practice in Spain. Thanks to
the records of each bar association we have reconstructed the number of lawyers
practicing Law in each geographical location and every year. According to the
results, there are more than 160,000 lawyers in Spain. Before 2011, they all
went to law school for four or five years at the end of which they registered with
the provincial9 bar association (Colegio de Abogados) and could start practicing
law.10 Most, of course, went through some training period before starting a
career in law practice (there are around 122,000 practicing lawyers in Spain at
9Some provinces in Spain have more than one bar association. For instance, in the province
of Asturias there are two bars, one in Oviedo (the capital of the province) and one in Gijón
(the bigger city in the province). Sub-provincial data have been adequately merged in our
analysis.
10Under the so-called Bologna higher education reforms, the undergraduate degree has been
reduced to four years in all cases (now called grado en derecho). However, in order to be a
member of the bar, after 2011, a candidate needs both the undergraduate degree and the
master degree as mentioned in the introduction.
the end of our period of analysis). Others might have opted for a job outside of
the legal profession strictly speaking, such as in-house councilor (about 40,000
non-practicing lawyers are estimated to exist in Spain). Figure 2 shows the
average (2001-2009) number of lawyers (*1000) per capita in Spain by province.
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There is a federal bar (Consejo General de la Abogacía Española, CGAE) lo-
cated in Madrid; however, the structure is quite decentralized and the provincial
bar associations (Colegios de Abogados) exercise most of the actual regulatory
and enforcement powers.
As for the measurement of the volume of cases computed to measure lit-
igation, we focus on the civil conflicts (i.e., those of private nature between
companies and/or citizens). That is, we leave aside other types of conflicts (of
an administrative, criminal or purely labor nature). There are several reasons
for this choice: first, it is appropriate that we focus on homogeneous or equiv-
alent cases. In this sense, it would not be correct to aggregate conflicts over
contracts between private companies with conflicts between citizens and the
public administration (or with disagreements over labor law11 such as wrongful
dismissals). Each type of conflict relies on a different procedural law in Spain.
Secondly, across all jurisdictions, it seems correct to focus on civil litigation as it
is, with great lead, the largest in terms of number of conflicts resolved by courts
of law and is most relevant for the everyday business life of companies. Third,
civil law and its specific procedural laws are supplementary of all other relevant
legislation in Spain. Fourth, the literature on the economics of justice focuses
its analysis on civil/private conflicts (see Palumbo et al., 2013 for a summary).
Getting results for the civil jurisdiction guarantees certain comparability with
previous results in the literature. Finally, we separate civil conflicts from oth-
ers (particularly labor conflicts) because we can do that with our database: in
Spain, civil and labor conflicts are resolved by different jurisdictions (served by
different judges) in contrast with the judicial structure of other countries such
as Italy.
Broadly, for all disputes arising under private law, the procedures are regu-
lated by the “Civil Procedural Law” (CPL). It establishes the rules of access to
the court system, the formalisms the parties must comply with, the role of the
judge or court, the rules governing evidence, the appeal to superior instances
and any other related issues. The old “Civil Procedural Law” dated from 1881
(Civil Procedural Law, Royal Decree of February, 3, 1881, CPL 1881) governed
the procedures until 2001. The new law (Ley 1/2000, de 7 de enero, CPL 2000)
was passed in 2000 and has been in force since January 8, 2001.12
Using these civil data, we construct a measure of litigation. The “litigious
cases” measure is calculated as a proxy of the cases to be resolved by the courts
in a specific moment of time, that is the sum of the new private civil cases
13As it was mentioned in the introduction, in 2006, a law introduced a new form of access to
the legal profession which became effective in November 2011 (after a five year moratorium).
(conflicts) arriving to the court plus the pending cases which still are waiting
to be solved by the specific judge in a certain moment of time (backlogs).
When constructing the measure, we consider the period 2001-2010 which is
limited by two important changes, the reforms of civil procedures in 2000 and the
already mentioned reforms in the access to the legal profession in 2011.13 The
reason why we begin our analysis in 2001 is because the old and new procedures
have substantial differences and should not be treated together in the same
econometric analysis (Mora-Sanguinetti, 2010). All measures are defined at the
11Technically labor law is not private law, but merges elements of private and public law.
Labor law is litigated in specialized courts subject to different procedural rules.
12The general thrust of the reform of 2000 was to simplify civil procedures and facilitate
litigation; therefore presumably reducing delays and congestion rates. Some evidence suggests
that such results were not achieved, precisely because a larger number of cases were drawn to
the courts in the period after the reform (Palumbo et al. 2013).
BANCO DE ESPAÑA 11 DOCUMENTO DE TRABAJO N.º 1505
provincial level. Formally there are no variations across provinces concerning
civil procedures (as the CPL applies in all provinces alike). However, demand
conditions clearly vary, so the models will control for them.
2.2 Demand side controls
With respect to controls, the models include the following: GDP growth, income
per capita (GDP per capita), number of associations per capita (which also
captures social "complexity" that might influence local litigation), the number of
enterprises per capita (for the same reason), unemployment rate (unemployment
rate), dummy of the province in which the High Court of Justice (TSJ) is
located (chief province) (which does not always correspond to the capital of the
region due to historical reasons)14 and non-performing loans ratio (NPL ratio)
(reflecting the proportion of defaulted credit contracts, which may be relevant
when it comes to capture litigation related to the business cycle). Table 1
includes a description of the variables used in the analysis.
The variables GDP growth, income per capita, unemployment rate and NPL
ratio control for the economic context. The empirical literature suggests that,
under some assumptions, litigation increases in economic booming (Ginsburg
and Hoetker, 2006) while other papers have found that litigation fosters during
an economic recession (Palumbo et al., 2013). Part of the explanation for the
ambiguous results is that the type of litigation is likely to respond to economic
cycles. Since we are aggregating civil litigation, there is no prior expectation
concerning the signs of the coefficients associated with the economic variables.
In the period considered, 2001-2010, we have two clear stages of the Spanish
business cycle: an economic booming up to 2008 and an economic downturn
since then to the end of the period considered.
We include the number of associations and number of enterprises, both in
per capita terms, to account for differences across potential sources for litiga-
tion. Environments with more social “complexity” are expected to induce more
litigation.
The dummy of the province in which the TSJ is located controls for legal
infrastructure that makes public dispute resolution mechanisms more readily
available. Therefore, they may pose a positive effect on litigation.
14As for example in the case of Andalusia, the Supreme Court is based in Granada, not in
Seville.
The correlation between the various controls (see Table 2) is generally low
so there should be no concern with possible problems of multicollinearity.
3 Empirical strategy
3.1 The model
We have adjusted a panel data model, where the dependent variable is a mea-
sure of litigation (volume of “litigious cases”). The independent variable of
interest is the number of lawyers per capita. The number of lawyers per capita
may be endogenous and is thus instrumented (see section 3.2 below). Demand
side conditions are taken into consideration in the model by the inclusion group
of controls presented in the previous section. The model includes time dum-
mies and regional fixed effects to partially control for unobserved heterogeneity.
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Errors are clustered to make them robust to heteroskedasticity and serial cor-
relation (Angrist and Pischke, 2009, Wooldridge, 2010).
The panel data model follows:
both part of the province of Barcelona, but we have the GDP for the Barcelona
province as a whole). In terms of the analysis, this has the drawback of losing
the “sub-provincial” determinants in the decisions taken by individual litigants.
In terms of the econometric validity of the experiment, it is necessary to
clarify whether the Spanish provinces as such generate barriers to the activity
of lawyers. If there were no barriers of any kind, i.e., if the Spanish legal pro-
fessionals work with cases or clients all over Spain (with no preference for those
geographically closer)15 the validity of the results would be partially compro-
mised. This is not the case in Spain. The legal services market is partially
fragmented due to the dominant presence of very small firms.16 These small
legal advisors and professional services companies serve primarily in their own
province.17 Figure 3 shows the distribution of firms in the legal services sec-
15What is to say that we would be able to observe, therefore, that clients of any city seek
legal advice within and outside their province of residence.
16Which in fact reflects the corporate structure of the Spanish economy more generally. See,
among others, García-Posada and Mora-Sanguinetti (2014) and references therein.
17We should note the exception represented by the large Spanish law firms (Garrigues,
Cuatrecasas - Gonçalves Pereira and Uría Menéndez) which actually occupy the first, third and
eighth positions concerning business turnover in the whole continental Europe [The Lawyer
European 100, 2013]. Those big law firms have their offices mainly in Madrid and Barcelona.
In order to take into account any distortions which those law firms may generate to the
analysis, the estimates show a robustness exercise excluding the observations from Madrid
and Barcelona. The results are consistent with those of the rest of the paper.
Log(litigious_cases)it =
T−1∑
t=1
ctTt+βLog(lawyers_per_capita)it+
K∑
k=1
Controlsk
i
+
K∑
k=1
Controls
k
t
+ ηr + νit
Where i = 1...50 is the province, t = 2001...2010 is the year and r = 1...17
is the region.
The chosen measure of litigation and the number of lawyers per capita enter
the specification in logarithms. This helps us to achieve normal distributions on
both sides of the equations. The results are robust to taking logarithms or not.
As it will be explained below, the use of time-invariant instruments poses
difficulties to the correct estimation of the model. Due to the use of those in-
struments, we cannot include provincial fixed effects and we have to accept the
less optimal option of including region (multi-province) fixed effects (ηr) to con-
trol for unobserved heterogeneity. As a way to control for provincial unobserved
heterogeneity, we follow Wooldridge (2010) and include as controls the average
of each control as well (which has provincial variation)(
K∑
k=1
Controls
k
t
).
For the purposes of the analysis herein, we have to aggregate the data at the
provincial level, although more disaggregated data could potentially be avail-
able. There are several reasons to do so. First, the provincial bars (Colegios
de Abogados) in Spain usually cover a whole province (although there are few
exceptions as explained above). Second, we lack more disaggregated data on
other important variables such as income per capita (e.g. there is no disag-
gregated data for the GDP of the city of Barcelona and the city of Sabadell,
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tor (and related professionals) by size (number of employees) using the DIRCE
(featuring the official business demography data in Spain).18 The graph shows
the average size for the period considered in this paper. We can observe the
very small size of the companies in the sector. Another reason for having strong
local markets in Spain is that there is also some segmentation in the substantive
civil law which may give preference to local lawyers.19
3.2 Instrumental variables and controls
As it was explained, the relationship between the number of lawyers and litiga-
tion may be affected by a standard problem of endogeneity. In order to cope
with this problem it is evident the need to find appropriate instruments.
As a first instrument, we created a variable called "law schools in 1968"
which takes value 0, 1, 2 or 3 according to the number of law schools existing
in a province in 1968 (see table 3 below). Carmignani and Giacomelli (2010)
proposed a similar instrument for the case of Italy. That is, the instrument
18The figure graphs the joint results for the following sectors: legal services, accounting,
bookkeeping, auditing and tax consultancy. This is the lowest level of disaggregation available
in the DIRCE.
19 Specifically there is special civil (private) law (affecting a greater or lesser number of
legal issues) in the following provinces or regions: Vizcaya, Álava, Guipúzcoa, Catalonia as
a whole (including Barcelona, Girona, Lleida and Tarragona), Balearic Islands, Galicia as a
whole (including A Coruña, Lugo, Ourense and Pontevedra), Aragón as a whole (including
Zaragoza, Huesca and Teruel), Navarre, the region of Valencia as a whole (including Valencia,
Alicante and Castellón) and Extremadura (only in specific towns in which the “Fuero de
Baylío” applies).
takes value 0 if by 1968 the province did not have any law school; takes value 1
if by 1968 there was one law school in the province; takes value 2 for Barcelona
and Salamanca where there was two law schools (Universitat de Barcelona and
Autònoma de Barcelona in the first case, Salamanca and Pontificia de Salamanca
in the second case) and takes value 3 in Madrid (where it was possible to study
for a law degree in Universidad Complutense, Universidad Autónoma de Madrid
and Pontificia Comillas). We have added both private and public law schools.
For example, Madrid already had two public law schools (Complutense and
Autónoma) and one private (Pontificia Comillas). 1968 makes sense as a cutoff
date for Spain since the next Law school to be created after that year was the
UNED (Universidad Nacional de Educación a Distancia), created in 1972 and
serving all provinces at the same time. The last law school created before that
date is the University of the Basque Country (Guipúzcoa) law school in 1968.
Notice that students were supposed to study in the law school of their province
of residence.20 Figure 4 provides a graph with the distributions of the “old” law
schools.
The number of law schools does not really respond to any idea of court per-
formance but rather to mere “public administration” interests largely detached
from market considerations or quality concerns, reflecting funding policies en-
acted by the Ministry of Education and the preference for low cost profile of
offering law degrees. That is, the number of degrees offered (and their price)21
20This was not changed until 2001 with the approval of the Organic Law on Universities.
21As an example, the price of a full academic year of a law degree at the Universidad Carlos
III of Madrid in 2013 (i.e., after the rise in university tuition fees due to the current budgetary
crisis) is 1,279.20 euros. The price of a full academic year of a law degree at IE University (a
private university serving mainly the Madrid region area) was 18,000 euros. Therefore public
prices are still clearly detached from the market. Prices are largely regulated for all public
universities alike.
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does not respond to market demand in Spain unlike the case of the US. For
instance, the regulation which created the Universidad Autónoma de Madrid
and the Universitat Autònoma de Barcelona in 1968 was concerned by the
increasing population and overcrowded classrooms, but not about quality di-
rectly, court performance nor the specific situation of the legal services market
in the province.22 Note also that the Autonomous University of Madrid and
the Autonomous University of Barcelona were not created to hold a law school
exclusively, but had a multiplicity of schools offering different degrees. All these
reasons, besides the obvious temporal distance between the market situation in
1968 and our period of analysis, make us think that is a good instrument.
We have also constructed a second instrumental variable which measures
the number of kilometers (walking distance) between the current capital of the
province to the capital of the historical university district (1845) in which the 10
historic law schools were located. The capital of the university districts, accord-
ing to the 1845 General Plan were: Santiago de Compostela, Oviedo, Valladolid,
Zaragoza, Barcelona, Salamanca, Madrid, Valencia, Seville and Granada. Our
instrument takes the value 0 in the case that the current provincial capital was
also capital of the historical university district. Figure 5 shows the bound-
22Royal Decree-Law 5/1968, of June 6th on university urgent restructuring measures.
aries of the districts and their capitals. For example, Granada has a value of
0 for being district capital and capital of the province of Granada, however
Almería has a value 161 (the walking distance between Almería and Granada).
The number of kilometers taken into account is the distance in kilometers that
would be required to walk, while we have no measures in kilometers of the net-
work infrastructure available at the time. The only university not located in
a provincial capital is Santiago de Compostela (hence all the provinces of its
district have a nonzero value). It seems interesting to note that the boundaries
of the university districts do not correspond to the limits of the current Spanish
regions.
The same reasons explained above should be valid to justify the validity
of this second instrument. Moreover, in this specific case it is clear that the
location of a law school in 1845 should not generate demand for legal services
today.
Both instruments (distance to the historic district capital and number of law
schools in 1968) show a low correlation (-0.0813). Following Wooldridge (2010)
we also add as "excluded" instruments the interactions of those two instruments
with the time-dummies (18 more instruments) while both the structure of the
historical university districts and the presence of law schools in 1968 may have
different predictive power depending on the year of our period of analysis.
The results of the tests of adequacy for these instruments are provided and
discussed in the next section.
4 Results
Table 4 presents OLS estimates. Column 1 only includes fixed effects and time-
dummies. Column 2 displays the results for a direct impact of lawyers per capita
on litigation (litigious cases). Column 3 looks at the impact of lawyers in the
previous year on the present litigation. Column 4 allows for two lags. These
robustness check may be useful while lawyers may litigate in the courts with
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some delay (it seems natural to think that lawyers need some time to learn and
apply new regulations). Column 5 excludes Madrid and Barcelona as it was
justified in Section 3 (presence of large law firms). Following these results, a
higher number of lawyers per capita seem to increase litigation. The impact is
statistically significant (at the 5% level) in all the cases.
Table 5 shows the effects of lawyers per capita on litigation when we instru-
ment lawyers per capita using our set of instruments. The structure of the Table
is similar to that of Table 4. The impact of lawyers on litigation is positive and
significant (at the 5% level). All test of adequacy of the instruments show good
results.
From the comparison between tables 4 and 5, we can see the results are
largely aligned and fairly robust. We can observe upfront that “lawyers per
capita” have similar (and significant) impacts on the dependent variables whether
we instrument it or not.
It seems that our empirical analysis suggests against the endogeneity of
“lawyers” in the Spanish context and for the period in consideration. First, the
endogeneity test for “lawyers per capita” (not reported in the tables) shows that
the variable might have been treated as exogenous.23 Second, we can observe
that the coefficients in Tables 4 and 5 are very similar. If there were bidirectional
causality (i.e., more lawyers generate litigation and also additional litigiousness
attracts more lawyers to the market), the coefficients of OLS regressions should
be larger. That is, when we instrument “lawyers per capita”, we should be
observing only one direction of causality (the impact of lawyers per capita on
judicial inefficiency, but not otherwise). This evidence leads us to think that in
Spain for the specific period of analysis there seems not to be a strong evidence
of two-way causality.
Summing-up, we do not have strong evidence suggesting that increased lit-
igation attract more lawyers to the legal market. Spanish universities seem to
have“produced” an excessive number of lawyers which in turn brought an addi-
tional workload of new conflicts to the court system. However, more litigation
did not attract more lawyers to the market as consequence. These arguments,
of course, do not rule out that there may be more clear signs of endogeneity in
other periods or in the long term in Spain.
The bottom line is, for the period 2001-2010, and across Spanish provinces,
we can conclude that the impact of one percent increase in the number of lawyers
per capita increased litigation by around 1.4%.
5 Conclusions
We have documented that, as happens across countries, there is a positive re-
lationship between the number of lawyers per capita and litigation rates across
Spanish provinces during the period 2001-2010, so that an increase of one per-
cent increase in the number of lawyers per capita is associated to an increase in
litigation rates of around 1.4 percent. This result holds either when we analyze
the association using OLS estimates or when we use an instrumental variable
(IV) approach (being the instruments two variables that capture the previous
23The P-values range between 0.2701 and 0.7935 depending on the specification.
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presence of law schools in Spain in 1845 and 1968). This association may have
multiple sources and should not, in principle, to be interpreted as a casual rela-
tionship.
The IV results suggest that there could be some supply-pushed litigation
and that a moderation in the number of additional legal conflicts might require
either some restrictions to the judicial resolution of conflicts or a rise of its
costs, among other measures. These results could also be informative for a
(preliminary and partial) evaluation of two policy measures adopted recently
in Spain: the reform of 2006, effective in 2011, concerning legal education, and
the "Law of Court Fees" approved in November 2012,24 which somehow created
disincentives to bring conflicts to the court system. Our results support the
hypothesis that the reduction in litigation observed recently in Spain (a 9.2%
reduction in the number of cases filed in the civil courts in 2013 with respect to
2012) may be, to some extent, a consequence of these reforms.
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Figure 1: Litigation rates around the world  
Source : Palumbo et al. (2013) 
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Figure 2: Average (2001-2009) number of lawyers (*1000) per capita in Spain by province 
 
Source : Own elaboration using the Census of the Consejo General de la Abogacía Española 
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Figure 4: Location of law schools in Spain in 1968  
 
 
Source : Own elaboration 
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Figure 3: Enterprises by size (number of employees) in selected professional services sectors  
 
Source : DIRCE (INE) 
0,00% 10,00% 20,00% 30,00% 40,00% 50,00% 60,00% 70,00% 
No employees 
1 to 2 
3 to 5 
6 to 9 
10 to 19 
More than 19 
No 
employees 
1 to 2 3 to 5 6 to 9 10 to 19 
More than 
19 
% of enterprises 64,73% 22,56% 7,26% 2,92% 1,94% 0,591% 
BANCO DE ESPAÑA 21 DOCUMENTO DE TRABAJO N.º 1505
Figure 5: Historical (1845) university districts  
 
Source : Own elaboration 
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Table 1: Variable descriptions  
 
Source : Own elaboration 
Variable Definition Scale/units Period Source
Litigious cases
Sum of the new cases 
(conflicts) arriving to the 
tribunals in a specific year plus 
the pending cases 
Number of cases By province, 2001-2011
Own elaboration from 
Consejo General del 
Poder Judicial (CGPJ) 
data
Log (Lawyers) per capita
Log of the number of lawyers 
inscribed in Bar associations 
divided by the population.
Log (Lawyers*1000 per 
capita)
By province, 2001-2009
Own elaboration using 
the census of the 
Consejo General de la 
Abogacía Española
Associations per capita
Number of associations per 
capita
Associations per capita By province, 2001-2010 INE /DIRCE
Enterprises per capita
Number of enterprises founded 
by individuals per capita
Enterprises per capita By province, 2001-2010 INE /DIRCE
Chief province
Province in which the High 
Court of Justice of the region 
is located
Dummy Not applicable Self elaboration
Law schools in 1968 
Law schools in Spain by 
province in 1968 
Number of law schools Not applicable Self elaboration
Distance to the district 
capital
Walking distance to the 
university district capital in 
1845
Kilometers Not applicable Self elaboration
Population Number of inhabitants Inhabitants By province, 2001-2009
INE (Regional 
accounts) 
GDP growth Rate of growth of the GDP % By province, 2001-2010
INE (Regional 
accounts) 
GDP per capita
Ratio between current GDP 
and population.
Fraction By province, 2001-2009
INE (Regional 
accounts) 
Unemployment rate
Percentage of total workforce 
who are unemployed and are 
looking for a paid job.
% By province, 2001-2009 La Caixa
NPL ratio
Ratio of non-performing loans 
to total banking loans (only to 
Spanish companies by Spanish 
credit institutions)
Fraction By province, 2001-2009
Banco de España - 
Eurosystem
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Table 2: Correlations between controls  
 
Source : Own elaboration 
GDP growth
GDP per 
capita
Associations 
per capita
Enterprises 
per capita
Unemployme
nt rate
Chief 
province NPL ratio
GDP growth 1
GDP per capita -0.2117 1
Associations per capita -0.1054 0.5863 1
Enterprises per capita 0.0696 0.2733 0.1573 1
Unemployment rate -0.5435 -0.2151 -0.2171 -0.3261 1
Chief province 0.0289 0.1786 0.1627 0.1368 -0.0563 1
NPL ratio -0.6312 0.0553 0.0494 -0.1197 0.4944 -0.0993 1
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Table 3: Law schools in Spain by province in 1968  
  
Source : Own elaboration 
Province
Law schools in 
1968
Numeric 
value of the 
instrument
Year in which 
the university 
was 
established
Barcelona Universitat de 
Barcelona, 
Universidad 
Autònoma de 
Barcelona
2 1430, 1968
La Coruña Universidade de 
Santiago de 
Compostela
1 1495
Granada Universidad de 
Granada
1 1531
Guipuzcoa Universidad del 
País Vasco
1 1968
Madrid Universidad 
Complutense, 
Universidad 
Pontificia 
Comillas, 
Universidad 
Autónoma de 
Madrid
3 1293, 1892, 1968
Murcia Universidad de 
Murcia
1 1915
Navarra Universidad de 
Navarra
1 1952
Asturias Universidad de 
Oviedo
1 1608
Salamanca Universidad de 
Salamanca, 
Universidad 
Pontificia de 
Salamanca
2 1218, 1940
S.C.Tenerife Universidad de La 
Laguna
1 1792
Sevilla Universidad de 
Sevilla
1 1505
Valencia Universitat de 
València
1 1500
Valladolid Universidad de 
Valladolid
1 1295
Vizcaya Universidad de 
Deusto
1 1886
Zaragoza Universidad de 
Zaragoza
1 1474
Other provinces None 0 NA
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Table 4:  Effect of the number of lawyers per capita on litigation (OLS estimates) 
 
 
 
Note: (Clustered) Standard errors robust to heteroskedasticity and serial correlation 
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
 
METHOD OF ESTIMATION OLS OLS OLS OLS
OLS (excluding 
Madrid and 
Barcelona)
(log) Lawyers per capita 1.3807** 1.3838** 0.6998**
(0.6853) (0.5586) (0.3226)
(log) Lawyers per capita t-1 1.3744**
(0.5532)
(log) Lawyers per capita t-2 1.3429**
(0.5611)
GDP growth 0.7191 0.5580 0.8587 0.8515
(0.6136) (0.5639) (0.6462) (0.6871)
GDP per capita -0.0001** -0.0001* -0.0001* -0.0001**
(0.0000) (0.0000) (0.0000) (0.0000)
Associations per capita 0.0009 0.0004 0.0021 -0.0241
(0.0920) (0.0904) (0.0897) (0.0702)
Enterprises per capita -0.0084 -0.0091 -0.0093 -0.0114*
(0.0079) (0.0083) (0.0087) (0.0059)
Unemployment rate -0.0051 -0.0094 -0.0134 -0.0149
(0.0625) (0.0637) (0.0651) (0.0624)
Chief province 0.0116 0.0155 0.0227 -0.0853
(0.2962) (0.2935) (0.2921) (0.2436)
NPL ratio 0.0637*** 0.0678*** 0.0663*** 0.0658***
(0.0120) (0.0100) (0.0098) (0.0101)
Constant 5.2795*** 5.4274*** 5.3825*** 5.3402*** 5.7557***
(1'9394) (1'8512) (1'849) (1'8829) (2'0947)
(Province) average of each control YES YES YES YES YES
Regional f ixed effects YES YES YES YES YES
Time dummies YES YES YES YES YES
Observations 500 450 450 450 432
R-squared 0.8698 0.8726 0.8725 0.8719 0.8621
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Table 5:  Effect of the number of lawyers per capita on litigation (instrumental variables 
estimations) 
 
 
 
 
Note: (Clustered) Standard errors robust to heteroskedasticity and serial correlation 
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
 
METHOD OF ESTIMATION IV (2SLS) IV (2SLS) IV (2SLS) IV (2SLS)
IV (2SLS) 
(excluding 
Madrid and 
Barcelona)
(log) Lawyers per capita 1.395** 1.4130** 0.7163**
 (0.7004) (0.5761) (0.3383)
(log) Lawyers per capita t-1 1.3717**
(0.5791)
(log) Lawyers per capita t-2 1.3718**
(0.5808)
GDP growth 0.7128 0.5588 1.8306** 0.8481
(0.6076) (0.5629) (0.7476) (0.6825)
GDP per capita -0.0001** -0.0001* -0.0001 -0.0001**
(0.0000) (0.0000) (0.0001) (0.0000)
Associations per capita 0.0004 0.0004 0.0273 -0.0242
(0.0919) (0.0900) (0.1266) (0.0702)
Enterprises per capita -0.0084 -0.0091 0.0074 -0.0114*
(0.0080) (0.0084) (0.0139) (0.0060)
Unemployment rate -0.0045 -0.0094 0.0006 -0.0146
(0.0628) (0.0639) (0.0711) (0.0629)
Chief province 0.0053 0.0161 0.0130 -0.0882
(0.2919) (0.2912) (0.2904) (0.2401)
NPL ratio 0.0634*** 0.0678*** 0.0679*** 0.0656***
(0.0121) (0.0101) (0.0113) (0.0102)
Constant 5.3001*** 5.4606*** 5.3795*** 5.2578*** 5.7718***
(1'9623) (1'871) (1'8786) (1'8596) (2'1072)
(Province) average of each control YES YES YES YES YES
Regional f ixed effects YES YES YES YES YES
Time dummies YES YES YES YES YES
Angrist-Pischke multivariate F test of excluded 
instruments (Prob › F) 0 0 0 0 0
Underidentif ication test (Kleibergen-Paap P-value) 0 0 0 0 0
Hansen J statistic P-value 0.1238  0.1236 0.0950 0.1253 0.4287
Sargan statistic P-value 0.3665 0.3241 0.2691 0.2985  0.3503
Observations 500 450 450 400 432
R-squared 0.8698 0.8726 0.8725 0.8713 0.8621
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